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GIDEON'S MUTED TRUMPET 
VICTORIA NouRSE* 
Once the darling of the legal academy, criminal procedure has 
fallen into disrepute. Thirty-five years ago, when Gideon1 was decided, 
criminal procedure was the flagship of constitutional law, criminal de-
fense attorneys were heros, and courts and lawyers were perceived as 
themselves agents of social justice. Today, there are still heros. But 
the conventional wisdom, within the academy and the country at 
large, no longer associates criminal law or procedure with heroism. 
Indeed, in some quarters, criminal procedure has become the enemy. 
Increasingly, scholars urge revisionism,2 popular pundits brand proce-
dural innovations as a loss of "common sense,"3 and philosophers 
warn that the "procedural republic" has helped us to lose our way.4 
Striking is this scholarly skepticism when compared to the dis-
turbing fate of those who spawned this conference: they are vulnera-
ble, poor, friendless; they have never seen a lawyer and they have 
talked to a judge speaking from a remote televised location. They sit 
in jail for ten or twenty or thirty days, 5 losing their jobs and their fami-
lies, only to have the charges ultimately dismissed.6 Douglas Colbert's 
* Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin. B.A, Stanford University; J.D., Univer-
sity of California, Boalt Hall. Thanks very much to Doug Colbert for inviting me to con-
sider this question and to Abby Ross and the editors of the Maryland Law Review for their 
help in preparing this essay for publication. All errors are, of course, my own. 
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963) (recognizing that an accused's 
right to counsel is one of the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice"). 
2. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil A mar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal 
Procedure Liberalism, 107 YALE LJ. 2281 (1998) (book review) (providing an overview and 
noting the dangers of one scholar's proposal for criminal procedure reform). 
3. See HARoLD]. RoTHWAX, GuiL"IY. THE CoLLAPsE OF CRIMINAL juSTicE 35-65 (1996) 
(arguing that the application of the exclusionary rule frequently leads to illogical results 
and presents a barrier to justice grounded in technicalities). See generally PHILIP K. How-
ARD, THE DEATH OF CoMMON SENSE: How LAw Is SuFFOCATING AMERICA 11 (1994) (exam-
ining our modem legal system and noting that "[i]n the decades since World War II, we 
have constructed a system of regulatory law that basically outlaws common sense"). 
4. See MICHAEL]. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY's DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A Pusuc 
PHILOSOPHY 4 (1996) (criticizing the "procedural republic" as a form of political philoso-
phy which "asserts the priority of fair procedures over partiular ends"). 
5. See Douglas L. Colbert, Section Endurses Appointed Counsel at Bail Hearing, A B.A. SEc. 
CRIM.jusT., Summer 1998, at 17, 17 (recounting the case ofjohn Holzan, who had "been 
in jail 27 days since his arrest on a misdemeanor charge of driving with a suspended li-
cense" before finally being released on personal recognizance). 
6. See id. at 18 (noting that "[i]n Maryland ... more than one-half of the 195,000 
criminal cases prosecuted in the lower criminal court during fiscal year 1997 ultimately 
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cases raise important questions about a failed legal revolution.7 For 
when the charges have been dismissed, what will Colbert's defendants 
understand about "criminal procedure"? The majesty of Gideon? The 
wisdom of the Warren Court? No doubt, the jailed and abandoned 
defendant would agree with critics of criminal procedure. How else 
could he see the "process" except as his punishment? 
Few in America would approve of "punishment-by-process"-the 
stock in trade of repressive regimes.8 And that, in one way, is my 
point. Rules of criminal procedure have become suspect, both in the 
scholarly and the popular imagination, because people view them as 
"special" rights, the stuff of judicial technicality and obfuscation, lead-
ing only to the protection of the worst among us. But this popular 
conception fails to recognize that there are important links, as punish-
ment-by-process suggests, between criminal procedure and our demo-
cratic form of govemment. In what follows, I argue that the Sixth 
Amendment9 vision of Gideon may be quite different from the one 
traditionally portrayed as linking the right to counsel to the right to a 
lawyer's assistance at trial. Under this vision, the right to counsel does 
not serve to protect guilty defendants but to ensure equality and de-
mocracy for the rest of us. The lawyer is the individual's guarantor of 
a "right of opposition,"10 and, as such, is essential to a process of de-
mocratization, a process in which all interests (even the govem-
ment's) are subject to competitionY 
concluded without conviction" and "about 1,500 pretrial detainees are in custody because 
they could not afford to pay a 10 percent bail of $500 or less"). 
7. See Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Yea7:5 After Gideon: The Illusury Right to Counsel at 
Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 8-13 (finding a "widespread failure to recognize the 
right to counsel" when a defendant first "appear[s] for bail before a judicial officer" and 
that "nonassignment of counsel at the initial appearance is commonplace throughout the 
nation"). 
8. See, e.g., Heinz J. Klug, Note, The South African Judicial Order and the Future: A Com-
parative Analysis of the South African Judicial System and Judicial Transitions in Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, and Nicaragua, 12 HAsTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 173, 211 ( 1988) (describing 
a practice in pre-Mandela South Mrica whereby people, often innocent, were arrested and 
"made to endure a ... period of punishment by process") (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Crewe, Punishment by Process, SASH, May 1987, at 19-20). The author wishes 
to thank her colleague Heinz Klug for bringing this to her attention. 
9. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."). 
10. Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CoNSTITUTIONAUSM 
AND DEMOCRACY 195, 233 Uon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) ("The legally guaranteed 
right of opposition is ... a fundamental norm of democratic government; it provides an 
essential precondition for the formation of a democratic public opinion.") 
11. See Adam Przeworski, Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts, in CoNSTITU-
TIONAUSM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 10, at 59, 63 (describing the passage from an au-
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Lest this seem an academic proposition, recent events warn of the 
importance of the right to counsel to the democratic ideal. While the 
national press has fallen over itself to publicize the latest Miranda rul-
ing, 12 the most important criminal procedure development of the 
decade occurred elsewhere. You can be rich, white, or even a friend 
of the president13 and still be whisked away by the police, friendless 
and without counsel. Gideon's trumpet remains muted. In part, this is 
because we have forgotten that criminal procedure is for all of us, not 
just some. We have forgotten that we control the government not to 
subvert public ends or to inhibit crime control, but to prevent the 
government from using power to prefer itself and its needs over those 
of its citizens. 
I. SELF-REFERENTIALISM AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
To the average man on the street, there is no doubt something 
odd, something decidedly odd, about the ways in which lawyers talk 
about the right to counsel. It is hornbook law, for example, that the 
Sixth Amendment applies when "adversarial proceedings" have be-
gun.14 It is also hornbook law that counsel will not be provided until a 
"critical stage" in the proceedings.15 Ask the average person whether, 
when she is thrown in jail, it is an adversarial proceeding, and she will 
say, "Of course it's adversarial." Ask her whether she needs a lawyer 
and she'll say, "Of course it's critical." And, yet, conventional legal 
wisdom about the Sixth Amendment runs to the contrary: the average 
lay person's idea is not the law of adversarial proceedings or critical 
stages in the United States.16 
thoritarian system to a democratic one as a "process of subjecting all interests to 
competition, of institutionalizing uncertainty"). 
12. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 690-91 (4th Cir.) (holding that federal 
courts are not required to suppress Miranda-defective voluntary confessions), cert. granted, 
120 S. Ct. 578 (1999); Brooke A. Masters & Tom Jackman, justice System Worries About 'Mi-
randa, 'WASH. Posr., Feb. 16, 1999, at B1 (discussing the controversy sparked by Miranda 
and reaction to the Fourth Circuit's Dickerson ruling). 
13. The author is referring to Monica Lewinsky, whose affair with the President was the 
basis for an independent counsel investigation and subsequent impeachment of the 
President. 
14. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (plurality opinion) ("[A] person's 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that 
adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him."). 
15. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) ("In recognition of these reali-
ties of modem criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guar-
antee to apply to 'critical' stages of the proceedings."). 
16. See Colbert, supra note 7, at 5 (arguing that an accused's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel should extend to her initial bail proceeding and noting that "[m]ost people are 
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My point is not that lawyers have lost their common sense or that 
lawyerly language is obscuring, but that these terms may be as illumi-
nating for what they do not mean as for what they do. We all know the 
doctrinal reasons why, to the Sixth Amendment expert, adversarial 
doesn't really mean adversarial and critical doesn't really mean criti-
cal-adversarial or critical to the defendant, that is. 17 Indeed, because 
the doctrine has venerable origins and apparently wise purposes, we 
tend to forget that, for all our fine words and complex constitutional 
doctrine, the criminal procedure of the Sixth Amendment, and some-
times the Fifth, does very little to ensure a long and mutually support-
ive lawyer-client relationship. It neither requires the appointment of 
lawyers at the earliest stage of proceedings nor demands that the 
states provide enough lawyers or that the lawyers provided have suffi-
cient time to provide a competent defense. The doctrine has devel-
oped largely as a means to exclude tainted evidence and regulate 
police deception.18 Put another way, it serves to ensure the reliability 
of the system (writ large) rather than to protect the individual 
defendant. 
In a sense, we might have expected a chasm between the common 
sense of counsel and the law of counsel. Elsewhere, I have argued that 
much modem constitutional law doctrine has a peculiar flavor of self-
referentialism, a way of turning questions about the world into ques-
tions about the court.19 Whether it involves fundamental rights, ex-
pectations of privacy, or even habeas corpus, the Court too often talks 
skeptical when told that individuals are unrepresented when first appearing for a judicial 
bail determination"). 
17. The Supreme Court, in its Sixth Amendment evidentiary exclusion cases, has 
clearly held that "adversary proceedings" means the beginning of "judicial" proceedings: 
"Whatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the 
time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him-'whether by way of formal 
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.'" Brewer v. Wil-
liams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (plurality opinion)); see also 
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964) (holding that the Constitution is 
violated when adversary judicial proceedings have commenced against an individual and, 
in the absence of counsel, government agents engage in deliberate elicitation of incrimi-
nating information). The right to a defense against a criminal "prosecution," as provided 
in the Constitution, is thus defined in terms of "judicial" involvement in that prosecution. 
18. See, e.g.,jOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 25.02, at 437 (2d 
ed. 1997) (examining the Massiah rule and noting that some commentators have deter-
mined the underlying issue to be the scope of deceit allowable in governmental under-
cover work). 
19. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, Making Constitutional Doctrine in a Realist Age, 145 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1401, 1404-05 (1997) (asserting that the evolution of modem constitutional doc-
trine reflects "institutional self-doubt ... about the job of judging [and] the possibility of 
doctrinal failure"). 
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about its own institutional problems rather than the problems of the 
people it seiVes, leaving us in a cycle of ongoing arguments that appear 
to be about us, about the people and their problems, but are really 
about something else-the court's quest for legitimacy, its concern 
about its place relative to other institutions, and its reputation among 
court-watchers. In a certain sense, this institutionalizing of justice is 
inevitable in a complex world; all constitutional questions are, as my 
colleague Neil Komesar has argued, about institutional choice.20 But 
if that choice is made unthinkingly, if it is made with the idea that only 
the judiciary's interests are at stake (as opposed to those of the mar-
ket, of society, or politics), it risks at best diversion and at worst the 
creation of a constitution for the judges, not the people. 
The right to counsel is simply another example of this phenome-
non. Indeed, we can see it in the evolution of some of the great opin-
ions on the topic.21 Powell v. Alabama22 seems, today, an opinion of 
great courage. It tells us, for example, about the "fundamental char-
acter" of the right to a lawyer and its universality as a principle of 
constitutionallaw.23 But these statements, even when they are at their 
most eloquent, seem as much about the judiciary as about the Scotts-
boro defendants. After all, the Court in Powell used the right to coun-
sel to avoid the real question: the question of race-the question of 
how and whether a state could convict someone when it was commit-
ted to seeing them guilty-by-race. Powell did not hold that racism 
could taint a trial. Instead, it turned racism into a failure of process: 
the Court reached out to the right to counsel, transforming the 
"wrong" of racism into the judge's failure to appoint a lawyer. Indeed, 
even at its most eloquent, the Court seems to place judicial interests 
ahead of the defendants': for example, in a rather dramatic state-
ment, the Court states that a capital trial without counsel would 
amount to ·~udicial murder"24-the image of a license to kill is power-
20. See NEIL K KoMESAR, IMPERFEcr ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, 
EcoNOMics, AND Pusuc Poucv (1994). 
21. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (criticizing Betts v. Brady, 
316 U.S. 455 (1942), for failing to recognize that "appointment of counsel for an indigent 
criminal defendant is 'a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial'" (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. 
at 471)). 
22. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that the state trial court had a duty to assign coun-
sel for an indigent and illiterate defendant in a capital case, thus paving the way for 
Gideon). 
23. /d. at 68 ("[I]t [is] clear that the right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental 
character.") 
24. /d. at 72. Specifically, the Court states: 
Let us suppose the extreme case of a prisoner charged with a capital offense, 
who is deaf and dumb, illiterate and feeble minded, unable to employ counsel, 
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ful but noteworthy, as well, for the Court's emphasis on the danger to 
it rather than to the defendants. 
Every constitutional lawyer knows the reasons why Powell linked 
the Scottsboro defendants' right to a lawyer to the right to a fair trial. 
To overturn the convictions required a violation of "due process" 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.25 But this necessarily limited the 
scope of Powelfs protection. The embrace of "due process" and the 
invocation of a long list of circumstances demanding the defendants' 
representation ended up restricting the scope of the Court's "right to 
counsel." Thus, despite all the ringing phrases in Powell about the 
fundamental and universal nature of the right to counsel, it remained 
the case, after Powell, that the states could refuse to appoint counsel. 
For years after Powell, the "fundamental" nature of the right was 
largely rhetorical. The right to counsel remained a rather porous pro-
tection, dependent upon the specific facts and circumstances of indi-
vidual cases. 26 
Modem era cases have reenacted this drama-giving with one 
hand what is taken back by another-in a variety of contexts. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Wade,27 the Supreme Court expanded the 
right to counsel to require the presence of lawyers at lineups.28 How-
ever, in expanding the right, the court also laid the foundation for 
limiting it. It justified its requirement that lawyers be present at line-
ups on the ground that the lineup was a "critical stage" of the pro-
ceeding.29 In distinguishing other investigative techniques, the court 
laid the groundwork for the analysis that tells states today that they 
need not provide counsel at bail hearings. Only "critical stages"-
those stages that "might derogate from [the defendant's] right to a 
fair trial"30-demand counsel after Wade. The fair trial link thus be-
/d. 
with the whole power of the state arrayed against him, prosecuted by counsel for 
the state without assignment of counsel for his defense, tried, convicted and sen-
tenced to death. Such a result, which, if carried into execution, would be little 
short of judicial murder, it cannot be doubted would be a gross violation of the 
guarantee of due process of law; and we venture to think that no appellate court, 
state or federal, would hesitate so to decide. 
25. See id. at 71 (holding that a failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was 
denial of due process). 
26. In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), for example, the Court "refused to accept the 
contention that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel for indigent federal defend-
ants was extended to or, in the words of that Court, made 'obligatory upon the States by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340 (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 465). 
27. 388 u.s. 218 (1967). 
28. /d. at 224-27. 
29. ld. at 237. 
30. /d. at 226-27. 
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comes the measure or limit on the right to counsel rather than a rea-
son for the right to counsel. 
Wade's rhetoric is powerful: in almost magisterial terms, the 
Supreme Court tells us that "the accused ... need not stand alone 
against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, 
in court or out."31 Soon, of course, it was quite clear that the Court 
did not really mean that the accused "need not stand alone." Wade 
was later limited by Kirfry 32 and Ash,33 which emphasized the need for 
a "critical" stage only after "adversarial proceedings" had begun. Thus 
has the alleged "purpose" of the right to counsel, doctrinalized, come 
to be the means of limiting the "right to counsel," the way in which 
Powell and Wade and Gideon makes it possible that states may still re-
fuse to provide counsel in the kinds of cases that Doug Colbert has 
catalogued. 34 
Justice Black understood this and made it quite clear in his opin-
ion in Wade, where he emphasized the risks of the "critical stages" 
inquiry. He specifically warned that a "fair trial" might lie in the eye 
of the beholder and thus "might derogate from ... [a defendant's] 
right" to counsel.35 That, as he put it elsewhere, the fair trial link 
would make the right to counsel a "second-class" right.36 As he ex-
plained in Wade: 
31. Id. 
32. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (plurality opinion) (reasoning that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to police conduct occurring prior to 
"the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings"). 
33. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (holding that a photographic dis-
play, even if conducted post-indiconent, is not a critical stage of the proceedings and there-
fore does not trigger the right to counsel). 
34. A similar dance appears in Argersingerv. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (expanding 
Gideon to encompass misdemeanor cases: "(A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no 
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or 
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial") and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 
373-74 (1979) (limiting Ar~inger's right to counsel in misdemeanor cases based on its 
"imprisonment" rationale: "[N]o indigent criminal defendant [shall] be sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of ap-
pointed counsel in his defense"). 
35. Wade, 388 U.S. at 247 (Black,J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 228). 
36. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 278-79 (1967) (Black, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). He states: 
[T]here is nothing in the Constitution to justifY considering the right to counsel 
as a second-class, subsidiary right which attaches only when the Court deems 
other specific rights in jeopardy. The real basis for the Court's holding that the 
stage of obtaining handwriting exemplars is not "critical," is its statement that 
"there is minimal risk that the absence of counsel might derogate from his right 
to a fair trial." The Court considers the "right to a fair trial" to be the overriding 
"aim of the right to counsel," and somehow believes that this Court has the power 
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[T]here are implications in the Court's opinion that by a 
"fair trial" the Court means a trial which a majority of this Court 
deems to be 'Jair" and that a lineup is a "critical stage" only because 
the Court, now assessing the "innumerable dangers" which inhere in 
it, thinks it is such . ... [l]t is clear from the Court's opinion 
in Gilhert v. California that it is willing to make the Sixth 
Amendment's guarantee of right to counsel dependent on 
the Court's own view of whether a particular stage of the pro-
ceedings-though "critical" in the sense of the prosecution's 
gathering of evidence-is "critical" to the Court's own view 
of a "fair trial." I am wholly unwilling to make the specific 
constitutional right of counsel dependent on judges' vague 
and transitory notions of fairness and their equally transitory, 
though thought to be empirical, assessment of the "risk that 
... counsel's absence ... might derogate from ... [a defend-
ant's] right to a fair trial."37 
To Justice Black, the critical stage analysis meant that the Court 
was balancing away the principles for which Gideon stood,38 and using 
"words like a 'fair trial' to take the place of the clearly specified safe-
guards of the Constitution."39 
Interestingly enough, modern commentary has paid very little 
heed to Justice Black's concerns. The conventional wisdom typically 
celebrates the link to trials. It was widely believed, for example, that 
exclusionary rule cases, like Mapp,40 would have difficulty achieving 
their goal-deterring illegal searches and seizures-precisely because 
"they addressed problems beyond the direct control of the courts."41 
By contrast, the right to counsel decisions were haled as fully realiza-
ble precisely because they dealt with "matters within the immediate 
to balance away the constitutional guarantee of right to counsel when the Court 
believes it unnecessary to provide what the Court considers a "fair trial." 
/d. (citations omitted). 
37. Wade, 388 U.S. at 24647 (Black,J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (em-
phasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 228). 
38. He explained: 
The Framers did not declare in the Sixth Amendment that a defendant is entitled 
to a "fair trial," nor that he is entitled to counsel on the condition that this Court 
thinks there is more than a "minimal risk" that without a lawyer his trial will be 
"unfair." The Sixth Amendment settled that a trial without a lawyer is constitu-
tionally unfair, unless the court-created balancing formula has somehow changed 
it. 
Gilhert, 388 U.S. at 279 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
39. /d. 
40. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
41. jEROLD ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CoNSTITUTION: LEADING 
SUPREME CoURT CAsES AND INTRODUCTORY TEXT 251 (1997). 
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and continuing control of the courts."42 Thus,'"even if sheriffs and 
police officers refused to carry out Mapp v. Ohio, trial judges and pros-
ecutors presumably could be "entrusted" to follow the dictates of 
Gideon and appoint counsel at appropriate times and places. 
This view has had a strong influence on the theory of the right to 
counsel. Indeed, conventional explanations emphasize the right to 
counsel as essential to a "fair judicial process" rather than the protec-
tion of individuals from State coercion.43 A leading casebook, for ex-
ample, urges that the right to counsel serves to protect the reliability 
of the "guilt-determining" process while individual liberty is protected 
by the exclusionary rule.44 Now, this is a very interesting state of af-
fairs. The claim is being made that protections of items seized, for the 
most part, stand as the great protection of liberty while the right to 
counsel protects the "process." I suspect that if you asked the average 
person on the street, they might find that this was a bit backwards-
that they would far rather have access to a good attorney when sent to 
jail than bet on the not-so-often exclusion of evidence at trial. Indeed, 
I expect that those who might be politically unpopular or social out-
casts might care a good deal more about consulting an attorney than 
about the introduction of evidence. Ask the Scottsboro defendants, 
were they alive, and I am sure that they would have wanted counsel, 
not just because of how that lawyer would perform at trial, but because 
he might have been their only way to communicate that they had 
been railroaded, targeted for their race, not their offense. 
It is not surprising, given this understanding, that many of the 
great cases about the "right to counsel" have avoided rather simple 
and, yet presumably important, questions about precisely when a de-
fendant should have meaningful access to a lawyer; instead, these 
cases have focused on the exclusion of evidence at trial. Miranda, 45 
Massiah,46 Escobedo,47 and Brewer48 all revolve, in one way or another, 
42. Id. 
43. See, e.g., Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem far an Endangered 
Right?, 29 AM. CRJM. L. REv. 35, 59 (1991) ("[T]he right to counsel significantly advances 
'fair process' and 'dignitary' norms that seiVe to legitimate the operation of the criminal 
justice system."). 
44. IsRAEL ET AL., supra note 41, at 251. 
45. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-72 (1966) (holding that an individual held 
for interrogation must be informed of his right to have counsel present and his privilege 
against self-incrimination). 
46. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (stating that the defendant's 
self-incriminating statements, obtained after his indictment and without benefit of counsel, 
"could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial"). 
47. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964) (holding that "when the process 
shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is 
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around the right to counsel; none, however, tells you precisely when 
that right attaches or what it looks like. Escobedo told us that the right 
attached very early in the process but, in a post-Miranda world, that 
has been taken back.49 Miranda, of course, offers a right to appointed 
counsel, or at least advice on that question, to protect the defendant's 
right against self-incrimination, but advice about counsel does not 
mean that counsel is actually provided or access assured. 
In part this is because of a trend in which the Sixth Amendment 
is typically litigated, and considered by the Supreme Court, as a ques-
tion of evidentiary exclusion. The question of when "adversarial pro-
ceedings" have begun, for example, is taught to students, as a general 
matter, through Supreme Court cases involving the use of particular 
kinds of evidence at trial. Indeed, some of the most difficult cases 
involve questions about when the police may "deliberately elicit" con-
fessions, wiretap confederates, or place informants in a defendant's 
jail cel1.50 Surely, these are important issues, issues that ask us to de-
termine when and how a government may investigate its citizens, but 
they have almost nothing to do with the aid that a lawyer might give to 
a client or the client's need for the lawyer. At most, they are about the 
ways in which police and prosecutors may interfere with the still-yet-un-
defined right to counsel. 
to elicit a confession-our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circum-
stances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer"). 
48. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399, 405-06 (1977) (holding, based on the cir-
cumstances of the case, that police violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel by eliciting incriminating information from him after the initiation of judicial pro-
ceedings and without notice to his counsel). 
49. &cobedo applied the Sixth Amendment to a pre-indictment interrogation-a case in 
which a defendant repeatedly asked for his lawyer and the lawyer, although in the station 
house, was denied access. &cobedo, 378 U.S. at 479-81. Later, in Kirby v. /Uinois, 406 U.S. 
682 (1972), the Supreme Court would "take back" &cobedo as a Sixth Amendment case and 
reconstrue it as a case that "like Miranda," was essential to "guarantee ... the privilege 
against self-incrimination" under the Fifth Amendment. /d. at 689 (intemal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966)). 
50. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986) (stating that when "police and 
their informant [take] some action ... that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminat-
ing remarks," defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated); United States v. Henry, 
447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980) (holding that self-incriminating statements made by an accused, 
while under indictment, when police "intentionally creat[e] a situation likely to induce 
[the accused] to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel," is a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206 (holding 
"that the petitioner was denied the basic protections [of the Sixth Amendment] when 
there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which 
federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the 
absence of his counsel"). 
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It is not surprising, in a world in which evidentiary exclusion was 
the remedial focus, that courts' institutional concerns would come to 
the fore. But it should be. For this focus has led to outcomes and 
emphases that, I think, from the average lay person's perspective 
could only seem decidedly odd. For example, although the Court has 
developed a complex set of rules and regulations governing when evi-
dence will be excluded as a violation of the Sixth Amendment, it has 
sometimes refused to protect the lawyer/client relationship as such. 
Ask a defendant whether he would find more protection from a rule 
that limited post-indictment investigatory efforts of police or if the po-
lice were required to inform him that a lawyer was offering his serv-
ices, and no doubt you will hear answers directly contrary to those 
given by the Supreme Court.51 
If the principal purpose of criminal procedure were to protect 
courts, then this upside-down world would make perfect sense. It 
would make perfect sense to start the right to counsel at judicial pro-
ceedings rather than when the defendant sits in jail; it would make 
perfect sense to worry more about evidentiary exclusions than about 
whether lawyers really assisted clients; it would make perfect sense to 
believe that the right to counsel depends upon critical stages of the 
proceedings rather than the risk of imprisoning the innocent or unpop-
ular. But that is not what most lawyers or most people think: they 
think, rightly, that lawyers are their allies and advocates. They think, 
as the Scottsboro defendants might have, that their lawyer is their only 
chance at equal justice; that he was their government. 
II. THE RIGHT TO CouNSEL AND LIMITED GoVERNMENT 
At the beginning of this essay, I urged that criminal procedure is 
not simply procedure for procedure's sake but a protection of demo-
cratic political structure. That sounds a bit fancy, but the history is 
quite down to earth and, indeed, represents (I believe) a rather old 
tradition in the field of criminal procedure and one with important 
implications today. 
The notion that criminal procedure is the criminal law of the po-
lice has a very old pedigree and has important implications for mod-
ern criminal procedure. In his stunning and prescient dissent in 
Olmstead v. United States, 52 Justice Brandeis wrote: 
51. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423-24 (1986) (holding that even deliberate 
deception of an attorney by the police does not change application of Miranda waiver 
rules). 
52. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), Ullerruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government 
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that 
are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, exist-
ence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to ob-
serve the law scrupulously. . . . Crime is contagious. If the 
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for 
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it in-
vites anarchy. 53 
Worn out by overuse, perhaps, this passage nevertheless is worthy 
of substantial scrutiny for, in it, Brandeis offers us a political-and I 
would argue substantive-theory of criminal procedure. For Brandeis 
is not, as is commonly understood, seeking merely to limit the exer-
cise of will by police, nor to elaborate upon the expressive purposes of 
law. He is linking criminal procedure and constitutional structure. It 
is the very "existence of the government"54 that Brandeis claims is at 
stake. Indeed, he later predicts "terrible retribution"55 if the govern-
ment may break the law in the name of enforcing it. To some, no 
doubt, this may seem hyperbole-surely the proverbial constable's 
blundering cannot bring down a government. Left unarticulated, yet 
implicit, is Brandeis's assumption that a government that breaks laws 
becomes better than its citizens; that it betrays the fundamental tenet of 
democratic self-government according to which the government is the 
agent, rather than the master, of the people. Mter all, what is the 
definition of an authoritarian regime but the bending of established 
procedures for the sake of a political or wealthy elite.56 Brandeis's 
prediction that the very "existence of the government"57 was at stake 
was no exaggeration; it was a statement of political faith in a democ-
racy's dependence upon the idea of a government as the servant of its 
citizens. 
This message of equality has played an important role in the his-
tory of criminal procedure, particularly when it comes to the question 
of race. Long before the Warren court's decisions, the Supreme 
Court sensed the dangers of a government that used its police ma-
chinery selectively against some citizens. As early as Powell v. Ala-
53. /d. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
54. /d. 
55. Id. 
56. See Przeworski, supra note 11, at 60 (arguing that the "essential feature of [authori-
tarian] regimes is that someone [or some group] has an effective capacity to prevent polit-
ical outcomes that would be highly adverse to their interests" and that "the power 
apparatus in an authoritarian system exercises not only procedures but also substantive 
control over decisions"). 
57. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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bama,58 police sanctioned racism was conceived, 'by the Court, as a 
failure of procedure.59 This would come to be a strategy followed 
closely by Earl Warren.60 Rightly, Warren was worried that the State 
was using the criminal justice system to demoralize, disenfranchise, 
and otherwise demean blacks, reenacting in more civilized garb a ter-
rible history of state-approved coercion and violence we now know as 
slavery's legacy.61 
Warren's revolution aimed to increase the transaction costs of ra-
cism and thus to deter the use of the police as a tool of the southern 
white aristocracy. Rather than attempting to single out racism by 
looking for bad racial motives, Warren, in a move characteristic of the 
politician, attempted to link the rights of the minority to the rights of 
all-not pitting blacks and whites against each other or viewing racism 
as a tortious wrong, but demanding that all be subject to the same 
procedures. By increasing the costs of policing and prosecution, and 
by empowering their institutional competitors (lawyers), the hope was 
that the costs, and visibility, of racism would also increase. But, of 
course, the political price of this (its generalization) was also its undo-
ing: across-the-board procedures also increase the cost of crime con-
trol generally. It was not surprising, then, that political support for 
this attempt to shift the costs of racism to the majority would come 
under attack as soon as the public perceived the costs of crime to out-
weigh the costs of racism. Nor, in some sense, should it be surprising 
that the Court's own enthusiasm for this approach would wane. For 
once the institution's reputational benefits no longer appeared tied to 
saving the poor and downtrodden (and secretly fighting racism), its 
58. 287 u.s. 45 (1932). 
59. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. Pawell was not the only early case 
involving egregious use of the criminal justice system against Mrican Americans. See, e.g., 
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 227-35 (1940) (involving the confessions offour Blacks 
who were interrogated continuously for a week with the last session lasting all night before 
confessions were signed); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279 (1936) (involving confes-
sions which were "extorted by officers of the State [using] brutality and violence"). 
60. See Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the Critical 
Tools of the Sixties, 67 TuL. L. REv. 2231, 2245 (1993) ("As Charles Ogletree has suggested, 
much of the Warren Court's 'criminal procedure' reform more properly should be under-
stood as constituting a branch of race law." (citing Charles Ogletree, Lecture at the Ameri-
can Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting Uan. 1990)) ); see also William]. Stuntz, The 
Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L J. 1, 5 ( 1997) 
("The post-1960 constitutionalization of criminal procedure arose, in large part, out of the 
sense that the system was treating black suspects and defendants much worse than white 
ones."). 
61. See Nourse, supra note 19, at 1440 & n.177 (noting that disenfranchisement has 
often been linked to crime in the history of the oppression of Mrican Americans). Indeed, 
in discussing criminal procedure, it is all too often forgotten that felons are, by law, often 
prevented from voting. 
1430 MARYlAND LAw REVIEw [VoL. 58:1417 
own institutional costs (of generating a complex set of cases creating a 
constitutional tort law for police and administering it under a contro-
versial exclusionary rule) became quite clear. In the face of these two 
developments, the Court's criminal procedure decisions have satisfied 
few, on left or right, with the exception, I suspect, of the Court itself. 
For decades, academics have assumed that the courts are essential 
to the protection of criminal procedure rights. If I am right about the 
dangers of institutional self-referentialism, it should not be surprising, 
in the end, to see that courts are subject to constraints too, just as are 
political institutions. But if this is true, then the new criminal proce-
dure will have to be a debate that is far more sensitive to the virtues 
and vices of institutional choice. It may well be, for example, that in 
some cases the balance is best struck outside the courts, in local com-
munities or in administrative agencies. 62 Indeed, it may be that we 
need to think of new ways-other than procedure itself-to link the 
interests of defendants and police, by turning to substantive law,63 for 
example, or by looking at the protections offered by constitutional 
provisions other than those typically employed.64 At the same time, it 
is also true that "reformers" cannot forget the role that criminal pro-
cedure does, and should continue to play, in barring the use of state 
violence to enforce social norms of inequality and superiority. 
62. See generally Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 86 GEO. LJ. 1153 (1998) (arguing for a new system of criminal procedure 
more responsive to communities' needs). 
63. Linking the rights of the potential defendant to the rules governing all members of 
society provides a natural resistance to the claim that the defendant's rights are simply 
"special" rules for criminals. For example, the earliest English criminal procedure deci-
sions used trespass rules to restrict the government's use of the search and seizure power. 
See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE LJ. 393, 396-99 
(1995) (describing this history of the Fourth Amendment). Today, however, this idea of 
linking state law to criminal procedure has been lost. A state may violate state or federal 
law in conducting a search and, yet, conduct a "reasonable" search under the Fourth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,452-55 (1989) (O'Connor,]., concur-
ring) (rejecting the notion that the legality of a search under federal (air traffic) rules was 
relevant to Fourth Amendment determination). For a different, and important, argument 
about the relationship of state substantive criminal law and criminal procedure, see Stuntz, 
supra note 60, at 6 ("Constitutionalizing procedure, in a world where substantive law and 
funding are the province of legislatures, may tend to encourage bad substantive law and 
underfunding. But constitutionalizing some aspects of substantive criminal law and de-
fense funding would not tend to encourage bad procedure, or bad anything else."). 
64. For example, the Takings Clause has been ignored by traditional criminal proce-
dure literature. U.S. CoNST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation."). When the State wrongfully imprisons or holds its citi-
zens, it seems far from a stretch to argue that the citizen's time and labor (and thus his 
"property") has been "taken" without "due compensation." See RicHARD A EPSTEIN, TAK-
INGS: PRIVATE PROPER"IY AND THE PoWER OF EMINENT DoMAIN 331-34 (1985) (advocating an 
expansive view of the concept of property). 
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If any of this is correct, the right to counsel should not be under-
stood simply as procedure for procedure's sake. Nor is the right to 
counsel to be preferred simply to achieve fairer or even more accurate 
trials. The importance of the lawyer in these circumstances is not 
someone to try a case (most cases are never tried), but someone to 
stand with the individual citizen unaligned to the forces that laid him 
low and resist claims of the natural and inevitable superiority of gov-
ernment. Can a citizen, stowed away injail, believe that he is "equal" 
before the law, when he cannot prove that the authorities are 
wrong?65 When the law is the citizen's enemy, and procedure his pun-
ishment, his government is by definition above him, propped up by 
authority, not consent. 
The right to counsel is at least as much about controlling politics 
as about fair trials, as much about reducing the influence of social 
norms of inequality on governments as about critical stages in judicial 
procedure. Justice Black knew this. And he wrote it, in Gideon. While 
much of the opinion is spent interring earlier precedent, near the end 
Black expands upon his theory of the right to counsel. He tells us first 
that it is simply "obvious" that "any person haled into court, who is too 
poor to hire a lawyer," cannot be assured a "fair" trial.66 But why is 
this so? Black's immediate answer is not about the aid that a lawyer 
may provide at trial. He tells us that "[g] overnments, both state and 
federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machin-
ery to try defendants accused of crime."67 Not surprisingly, from here, 
Black appeals to democracy. He tells us that "[t]he right of one 
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and 
essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours."68 From the 
very creation of our constitution, Justice Black tells us, the states and 
the nation have each sought to ensure that "every defendant stands 
equal before the law."69 
65. By emphasizing the role of equality, I am not urging that the law of criminal proce-
dure should aim to put the defendant and the government on an "even-playing field." No 
rule of criminal procedure can do that. Nor am I suggesting that rules of criminal proce-
dure can equalize wealth or eliminate racism. Again, no rule of criminal procedure, alone, 
can achieve those ends. Rules of criminal procedure, however, may provide the means by 
which the citizen can subject the government's interest "to competition," to test its claims 
for consistency and to alert us to cases in which the government's power is being used to 
protect government itself or protect some citizens against others (largely by incorporating 
social norms of inequality into law). 
66. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
67. ld. 
68. ld. 
69. /d. (emphasis added). 
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Gideon is not about procedure for procedure's sake, adversarial 
proceedings or even critical stages. Gideon is about the ultimate 
agency problem in a republic-governing the governors so that the 
people govern themselves. May we continue in that understanding of 
Gideon a short thirty-five years after its decision, for through it, we may 
remember the wisdom and importance of the right to counsel. 
